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Epistemic Authority, Rationality 
and the Fallacy of Educational 
Democracy 
by John H. Chambers 
Tasmanian College of Advanced Education, Launceston 
In any rational authority system, authority must be closely connected to 
point, purpose and function. The situation of authority in colleges and univer-
.sities (T.E.l.s*) provides a special case of such point, purpose and function. 
The present paper tries to show the quite special features of the epistemic 
dKI'O~l\fleaCle) authority of academics that provide rational justification for their 
in many positions of social authority in their institutions. To do this, (1) 
aspects of the point, purpose and function of such epistemic 
,tn'"lrIf·'I>." will be demonstrated, (2) the logical necessity of academic 
nes for rational endeavour will be pointed out, and (3) the mistakes in-
in the common notion of educational democracy will be exposed. 
Point, Purpose and Function of Epistemic Authority 
Firstly, some general societal aspects of epistemic authority should be in-
It is clear that no person can hope to master more than a minute part of the 
10\'~leclae that exists. In order that it is all mastered, there need to be 
1ovvle(jge!'s~)eciali~sts: this is similar to saying that there need to be epistemic 
Concomitantly, it can be argued that the vast body of knowledge 
mastered by people who become epistemic authorities, if the 
complex, industrial, liberal Western democracies are to continue to 
what makes the existence of knowledge or epistemic 
a sort of natural necessity, is that mastery of any area of 
:lWleaCle is itself a slow and laborious business, that must be gone through 
person is in a position to understand, let alone, to criticise, judge, 
develop the area, in an informed rather than a superficial way. (It is 
case that some people just seem to be 'drawn' to particular 
and to do well at them, while there are areas of knowledge that 
intelligent part of the population is just incapable of understanding.) 
, as de George says, 
Reliance on authority is a way in which knowledge can be transmitted 
and shared, so that more men may know and use this knowledge than 
would otherwise be the case. This, in brief, is the basis for the argument 
that epistemic authority is in general legitimate. The argument is a 
'" tertiary educational institution 
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pragmatic one, and it claims that in some cases it is reasonable and ra-
tional to accept the word of someone else that p is the case (de George, 
1976, p.83). 
And further, 
Epistemic authority is thus in principle substitutional in nature. Its pur-
pose is to substitute the knowledge of one person in a certain field for the 
lack of knowledge of another (de George, 1976, p.82). 
So whereras social authority uses other persons to get things done, 
knowledge authority is used by other persons both to gain knowledge and to 
get things done. 
Two qualifications should now be made. Certainly it would seem that the 
sensible thing to do for anyone who is not an authority on a given subject, is 
.. to defer to the beliefs of those who are, for what better grounds can 
one who is not knowledgeable in a given field have for a belief in that area 
than that it is the belief of one who is knowledgeable in such matters, 
especially of one whose business is to know about such things?* 
(Adams, 1976, pA) 
What is more, the person knows, ". ,. that the authority, in assessing the 
reasons that are available to him, has been led to this position" (Adams, 1976, 
p.5). But while all this is true, it (a) must be carefully noted that the knowledge 
or epistemic authority is indeed restricted to the area of knowledge, except for 
some possible transfer to adjacent disciplines and except for"_ •. the transfer of 
scholarly habits of care, toughmindedness, etc/' (de George, 1976, p.85). 
And (b) someone is to be considered an authority in various degrees: the 
history teacher is an authority in relation to his pupils: depending on his 
special period, he mayor may not be an authority in relation to the T.E.llee-
turer. 
Secondly, some specific attributes of the individual epistemological authori-
ty should be noted. 
Academics have themselves passed through T.E.l.s specifically established 
to train and educate. They have acquired specialist knowledge and u 
ding, and in various degrees some expertise in passing on and developing this 
knowledge and understanding in others. And the diplomas and degrees they 
have acquired are society's stamps of approval to show that this is indeed 
case. This is far from suggesting that T.E.I academics are all-knowing, or 
some very narrow and bigoted people do not become academics. Neither is 
to suggest that for those academics who have teaching qualifications 
qualifications are fool-proof and mistakes never made in such certification. 
is merely to say that most academics have mastered a significant 
ding in a specialist area. 
As time passes, academics generally increase this knowledge and PVI'lP,-ti"i' 
developing, modifying and refining it through interaction with others 
through a developing sensitivity to the nuances of the discipline. 
*The author is not talking about matters of mere belief, (such as religion?) 
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Academics also .demonstrate their knowledge and competence: they 
~evelop understanding and a degree of mastery in their students; they con-
tmue to turn out graduates who can take their place in the complex activities 
?f :~e real ,":,orld .. The ~nowl~dge authority of academics is really being 
Justified ?o~tlnually In an I~ductl~e manner. It is justified in and depends upon 
t~e co~tlnulng proper dealing with actual cases. Like all inductive generalisa-
tions, It :akes only a :ew cases of being wrong for their authority to begin to 
be questioned. (Is this a psychological rather than a logical issue? Is it a fact 
about how people ac~ually behave in relation to authorities, rather than about 
how they should logically behave?) 
Tha: . ac~demics. can in general demonstrate that they are epistemic 
authorities IS a reminder of the implicit point that there is no ineradicable dif-
ference between what an academic knows and what a student knows with 
the e~ception of course of students who just are intellectually incapable of 
grasping the n:atter. !he academic's claims are authoritative because they 
ha~e t~e bac~l~g ~f I~dependently establishable knowledge, a backing ac-
qUired In public Instltuyons, a b~ckin~ that if someone wishes, can be publicly 
a backing that given time and application most students can if 
desire to acquire for themselves. There is thus nothing metaphysical 
. th~ fact that academics are knowledge authorities who make 
~uthorltatlve ~taten:ents. It·is merely that they have passed through a period 
and place of ~nductlo~, and such induction is in principle equally possible for 
other. ratlon~1 being. Indeed, students in T.E.l.s are at various stages in 
very induction .. For the academic in his justified role is trying to make 
~edundant, In.the sense of trying to get his students no longer to need 
, trymg to make hiS students into his epistemic peers. The academic life in-
not just .the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, but also the 
.disiint,erested passing-on of knowledge. 
There is of course a crucial corollary. An academic is to be listened to 
!pt:l'lidll:;t:l he is an authority. But his authoritative utterance, like all such 
luv,rn,:lJIUI:! authority is only provisional. For we know very well that the in-
I history of mankind is a succession of the establishment then later 
of statements by an authority. The chemist, Arrhenius was award-
the Nobel Prize for his electrolYtic theory of dissociation; it was later given 
Debye for showing the inadequacies in Arrhenius's theory (Barbour, 1971, 
In cosmol?gy, Ptolemaic worldviews were succeeded by Copernician, 
Newtonlan and then Einsteinian, with questions nowadays even be-
asked about the last. 
showed the physicians of nineteenth century Vienna that it was 
who spread puerperal fever in childbed. Ben Jonson has given place to 
Dr. Johnson, Bradley, Knights or Knight, and Lewis in authoritative 
of Shakespeare. We know that today's authoritative utterance 
tomorrow. But equally, we know very well that we ought pro-
to accept such statements as the best at present available. The fact 
one au:~ority replaces another as time goes by is no argument for the 
relatiVity of knowledge or truth. Rather, it is evidence for the opposite: 
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the later authoritative statement is really a better explanation, a nearer approx-
imation to the truth. 
Students should have to do what academics tell them to do in connexion 
with the progagation of knowledge and understanding, because at least 
relatively speaking academics in T. E.I.s are provisional epistemic authorities. It 
is perfectly proper for academics to make pronouncements, give opinions, 
develop insights, demand answers, provide examples, promulgate orders and 
expect particular sorts of behaviour from their students in academic situa-
tions. But at the same time it is essential as I have said elsewhere (1976, p.6) 
that they do these things in a 'teacherly' way: authoritatively, not 
'authoritarianly' . Academics must develop epistemic authority, but equally 
they must develop a general and appropriate scepticism. This requires a nice 
balance between authoritative statement and qualification, and is probably 
the chief difference between being authoritative and being authoritarian. In 
being authoritative and' teacherly' , academics will try to develop in students 
a proper propensity to question, by showing that the evolution of human 
knowledge has been a gradual refinement, differentiation and development, 
but also the realisation that in epistemic matters one person's opinion is not 
just as good as another's. 
The upshot of the last few pages is that, as Peters argues, 
.•. knowledge can only be handed on and developed if institutions are 
devised for this purpose. If such institutions are to be organised on ra-
tional grounds, this means that those who are authorities on various mat-
ters are given the opportunity to instruct others and to take part in the ad-
ministation of the affairs of their institutions. Those who are authorities 
must be put in positions of authority at a level which is consistent with 
the principle of public accountability (1966, p.251). 
Peters is arguing that in a rational system, knowledge authorities because. 
they are knowledge authorities should be given the right to social authority. 
So for Peters, and the present writer agrees, the situation of the Kno"""leCIQe 
authority in the educational institution is but a special case of the more 
situation in a society that is based on rational authority. Here the crucial 
the rational authority situation comes through the interesting idea 
because what the epistemic authority says is right (correct, advisable), 
given the right (entitlement) to give orders, tell people what to do, in 
to that knowledge authority he possesses. This seems to me to have the 
portant corollary that academics should work hard at showing that 
epistemic authority is· actully a resource for the community in general and 
students in particular. 
The Logically-Necessary Connexion Between Rationality and Al:aQ'errl!C 
Disciplines 
It has so far been argued that it is rational to give social authority in T. 
to academics because in so doing, the point, purpose and function of T. 
are met. But other aspects of rationality can also be shown to feature 
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in the ~itu.ation. These have to do with the necessary rationality of epistemic 
authority Itself, embodied in epistemic authorities. 
Thought and b~haviour, in order to be rational in even the most elementary 
sense must ta~e Into ac~ount what has happened and what will happen, as 
well as what. IS ~appenln.g. Only the possession of language makes these 
features pOSSible In anything more than a superficial way. 
. The mor~ complex the language that takes in these aspects, the more ra-
tlon~1 does .'t become possible for the thought and behaviour to be. And it is 
.preclsely this. more complex language that makes up the entities that we refer 
to as theoretical knowledge or knowledge of disciplines. 
For bei~g rational involves not merely having concern for the point purpose 
function of an orga~isation or institution. It also involves, in' meeting 
p.urpose an.d functlo~ such features as seeking the truth, trying to get 
right, ar~~lng as loglcal~y as possible, providing good reasons for any 
,,,,,,::;\,Lua, pO~I.tlon held (which of course includes bringing to bear ap-
empIrical data) discriminating only when there are relevant dif-
and so ~n. The reason for mentioning this aspect of rationality here, 
show how It strengthen~ the. case of the epistemic authority; for the 
of .~nowledge of th~ eplstemlc authority would seem to put him in an 
position to complYI/I(~th these strictures of rationality in his own area of 
. Clearly, rati?n~lity has a great deal to do with the quality of 
. The better the thl.nkl~g, the more rational the argument, the more ra-
the person, and derivatively the more rational the organisation. 
But there is a f~rther ~n?erlying, epistemologically-fundamental aspect of 
that reqUlr~s pOinting out. Without this aspect, the very existence of 
worse, r~tlon~1 ~r more or less rational thinking would itself be im-
Bennett IS pOinting to this fundamental feature when he writes, 
. .. onl'( linguistic behaviour can be approriate or inappropriate to that 
which. IS not. both particular and present. . (whereas!. . non-linguistic 
beha~lIou.r. . IS necessarily related to states of affairs only in so far as it 
consl~ts In an attempt to do something about that state of affairs which 
constitutes the pre~en~ and particular environment of the behaver. . one 
conseq~ence of this IS that only in language is it possible to register 
theoretical knowledge (1964, p.87,88). 
is not merel,( that without the tool of language, men could never become 
at all.. It. IS. also the case that it is only because of the sophisticated 
of dlsclpl.lnes that human beings can master concepts such as point 
an.d .functlon and grasp what these are in complex organisational set~ 
and It IS o.nly because there is the sophisticated language of disciplines 
. beings c.an. engag.e in the more complex aspects of getting 
right, or thinking logically. The ~ame point can be put tangentially 
that for a person to be more rational he requires actual theoretical 
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, .' nal thinking and action cannot be carried 
and disciplined knowledge, for ratio .. . rder to be rational require that 
., R ( nal thought and action In 0 t 
on simpliCiter. a 10 • h selves with concepts and statemen.s 
the thought and action concern t I em Ids This means further, that cetens 
about the concrete and. conceptua wO~ed' e a erson has, the more rational 
paribus, the more expen~nce and know b g It aiso means that specialist and 
will his thought and actl?n be able tOd e~tionality in dealing with specialist disciplined knowledge Will hel~;o;a~ ~i~es of academic institutions s~?h as 
areas such as are cov~red by t p st d by the epistemic authorities of 
T.E.l.s, disciplines which have been ma ere 
such institutions. 
. between rationality in T.E.l.s and 
The logically neces.sary contex~on son for giving epistemic authorities 
disciplined knowledge IS ~hu~ a urt er rea 
the right to social authority In T.E.l.s 
The Fallacy of Educational DemocracY* . 
. f h' article comes through challenging a 
Further support for the. theSIS 0 t IS, te T E I social authority, For it is 
widespread misconception of approprTla El' ~;e one part of the larger 
, sted that because .' ,s " ' 
sometimes sug~e, h should be run' democratically , I.e. In 
democracy outSide their wallsh t ey , g of the larger democracy. Just 
manner si~ilar son:ehdow ~o t ~ ~~~~~er it is even a realistic option are 
this view Involves In etal, ~~t such critics appear to have in mind is at 
generall.y cI~ar. However, ~e vote situations, majority decisions and 
something like one ma~h?' seems to me to be a very atrophied 
of staff and students. IS VI~W t the outside democracy is a very 
that outside democ:ac~, For 17 faCt I and things such as the protection 
~~~~~~no~~ii~~~~:I~i~:S~~~e~o~e ~~~cial, A democracy is not a 
of the majority. As Andreskl says, 
The ultimate value of democracy is as a bulwark against tyranny and as 
means of achieving individual freedom (1976, p.58). 
, " f h sent case much of the actual 
What is more and 0: slgnl:lcance ~rtt.e ~~nsultation' with and in the 
tivity of a dem,ocratlc soclet
l
y co~s~so~i~S in authority, rather than in 
of representations to peop e an , 
having representatives on such bodies, 
, h umentation it may be suggested that 
To give more detail tO
I 
tbe, arg ffered by advocates of democracy in T.E.I 
democratic model usual y elng 0 
is suspect in two interrelated ways, 
t 'd the T E I is a multi-purpose 
Firstly, the general democracy o~ Stl e lated'T'E' I purposes of pursuing 
'h h I' 't d two In erre . ., not one Wit t e Iml e, " f the democratic state 
, k wledge The multi purposes 0 " 
passlng-o.n no b 11' d "the state's political and social concerns . 
may succl,nctly e ca edl I' t f things such as general concern for concerns Involve an en ess IS 0 
~This section owes much to the writing of R.S. Peters. 
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munity health and welfare, pensions for the old, road safety campaigns, 
foreign policy, crime prevention, providing money for defence, protecting the 
political interests of minorities, ensuring there are sufficient T. E.l.s, and so 
on. With respect to many of these issues, the ideas of one person are as good 
as those of another, hence the electoral policies of one man one vote that 
~"~".~~ on representatives to do the final deciding. 
But the purpose of a T.E.1. is not multiple in this way. T.E.l.s pursue 
knowledge and provide education and training for students in particular 
specialist areas. And as has just been argued, it is manifest that there are 
.th,nri1·i"" in these areas. So in order for academics to carry out these pur-
properly performing their functions, what is required is not some 
nl"hi~iti~ democracy, but the implementation of the two principles that Peters 
autonomy of academics (academic freedom), and provisional 
of academics (1973, pp. 44-45). 
knowledge is to be expanded and truth to be pursued, and if students are to 
inducted into this knowledge, then academics must be allowed freedom to 
on such endeavours. They must not be restricted by the predilections 
of politicians, businessmen, trade union leaders, authoritarian 
istrators, short-sighted student activists, or anyone else who may 
or find inconvenient to their cause, the things that pursuit of truth and 
ge reveal. To give in. to any of these is to provide the thin edge of the 
for the others. PolitYcal interference is probably the most all-encom-
and invidious. Examples are legion in most of the world outside the 
. Two representative examples are the disastrous effect on academic life 
University of Ghana by President Nkrumah, and the complete destruc-
of such academic life by Amin in Uganda. But examples are common of 
influence by some of the other groups just mentioned, for example 
'MIt1,,~,nr<'<>r1 student interference during the 1960s in academic life not only 
but in other parts of the world. To take but one instance. At the 
of Chile in Santiago, the Research Assistant in the Medical School 
his laboratory left uncleaned for six months because he opposed various 
to power by students and ancillary staff. This had the most adverse ef-
on the breeding programme in genetics, where twenty years of work 
(personal communication to the present writer). 
ng from the principle of the provisional authority of academics 
for earlier) is the claim that it is usually only academics who know 
just what is needed in a course that is to help students to master 
and just what areas at the edges of the field are likely to 
for further research and exploration. This means that academics 
have the controlling say in the content of courses, in the appointments 
academics in the field, and in the general control of accreditation of 
in that field (j .e. examining). Bell makes a significant observation, in 
calls the paradox of authoritarian (he means' authoritative' ) justifica-
he says, 
difficulty is that the very inequality for which the exercise of authority 
remedy may preclude those at whose benefit it is aimed from judging 
it is being exercised competently or not. I cannot help but feel 
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that this difficulty has been nicely illustrated in recent months (Bell was 
talking of 1970) by some campus debated between academics and 
under-graduates about the content of courses and curricula. Academics, 
called upon to justify their dealings with the undergraduate mind, face 
the difficuhy that it is an undergraduate mind which has to comprehend 
this justification. Hence the very justification itself risks appearing in 
undergraduate quarters as yet a further exercise of unjustified and ar-
bitrary authority (1971, p.202). 
Of course this does not mean that there are not times when academics need 
to be brought back to earth from their ivory towers by way of financial con-
straints and community pressures, or that there are not times when coteries of 
academics who decide to appoint only persons who hold political views similar 
to their own should be constrained by the outside democracy from using the 
T.E.1. as a place for indoctrination. It merely emphasises the significance of 
the principle of the provisional authority of academics and thus their crucial 
position in the authority hierarchy of T.E.l.s. 
Secondly, the above model of T. E.I. democracy is suspect in so far as, even 
in the wider democracy outside the walls of the T. E.I., one man one vote is 
ed only in specific cases. It is used to elect representatives to do the deciding 
in a parliament and a cabinet; it is thus used where issues are mUltiple general 
ones where the average person's opinion is as good as any other. 
although there are referenda on various issues, these are infrequent, and 
of general non-specialist concern to all citizens. Again, while there are 
course one man one vote situations in all sorts of organisations inside 
general democracy such situations occur only when one person's opinion 
as good as another, e.g. to decide on cricket club policy, or to elect the 
man of the women's institute. What is more, the general democracy also 
deed appoints specialists in a wide range of areas, and leaves them alone 
get on with their work. In fact, for the multiple purposes of a democracy to 
carried on, such specialists must most of the time be left to get on with 
job. And getting on with the job entails authoritative activity and decision, 
elections. To take an extreme case that makes the point properly: prisons 
fulfil their point, purpose and function in the general democracy by being 
autocratically. Hospitals are largely in the control of medical personnel, 
patients. And the same sorts of consideration apply from fire brigades 
kindergartens. In short, appropriate institutions in the larger democracy, 
order to fulfil their function and to run rationally do not have to be 
'democratically' if by 'democratically' is meant one man one vote 
and plebicites of the consumers or clients. Brubacher argues similarly 
. ,. neither college nor university is a political community. Its b 
not government but the discovery, publication and teaching of 
learning. Its governance is based not on numbers or the rule of 
jority, but on knowledge. The fact that a society is politically nrr,,,nll,,,,,n 
a democracy does not entail that all its other institutions-- its 
industrial corporations, military and naval forces-- must be so 
(1977, p.36). 
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Indeed, rational authority i d 
types, e.g. in business in then b~reaeu~~ac~acy falls under num.erous different 
in associations, and all of these varieties
Y a~: t~:n~~i~~~~~~ti~~i!~~~~e~nions, 
But of course in T Eis th I . 
tionally are not the pr~r~~ativ~~:~~:;~ a.reas(~f ~eCISi?n. and control that ra-
are such areas, that is at the base of m ~IC~. h er aps I~ IS the fact that there 
T.E.l.s.) Whether Indonesian ought to ~~keop ~ e ~onfuslon about authority in 
money ought to be spent on nucle r ce ence over French; whether 
whether there should be co-operatio~rb~~:~ tha~ ~~ so!ar energy projects; 
new library building should be constructed. :hneetlgh oun~g T..E.l.s; whether 
t ' er a university ought to be 
B: Ed~ ~~~~i~; i~o;hceu~~~ :t· ~~~ ~~~~~ w;etnh~h~~~ i:h:~:aad:d a a conc~r-
... ISS~~! :re as. muc~ the conce~n ~nd right of the in~erested layma~:~~~ 
. . umni, or.t e commUnity In general, as they are of the acad . ~~ ~OIn~UI, fun~tlon~l, purposeful and therefore rational to have ~~~~ 
e~p e toget er with academics on senates of universities and over 
... conuClls of CAEs, on state higher education coordinating bodies, ;nd s~ 
But it shoul? be carefully noted that the issues described in the . 
ph are Indeed non-.specialist social-moral ones on wh·lch th preVIOUS 
auth ·r··' ,ere are no 
tt
on les, a~d:~t~at epistemic authorities must be paramount on 
ma ers or rationality suffers. 
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